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ABSTRACT: When we encounter a new person or place, we may easily encode it into our 
memories, or we may quickly forget it. Recent work finds that this likelihood of encoding a 
given entity – memorability – is highly consistent across viewers and intrinsic to an image; 
people tend to remember and forget the same images. However, several forces influence our 
memories beyond the memorability of the stimulus itself – for example, how attention-grabbing 
the stimulus is, how much attentional resources we dedicate to the task, or how primed we are 
for that stimulus. How does memorability interact with these various phenomena, and could any 
of them explain the effects of memorability found in prior work? This study uses five 
psychophysical experiments to explore the link between memorability and three attention-related 
phenomena: 1) bottom-up attention (through testing spatial cueing and visual search), 2) top-
down attention (through testing cognitive control and depth of encoding), and 3) priming. These 
experiments find that memorability remains resilient to all of these phenomena – none are able to 
explain memorability effects or overcome the strong effects memorability has on determining 
memory performance. Thus, memorability is truly an independent, intrinsic attribute of an image 
that works in conjunction with these phenomena to determine if an event will ultimately be 
remembered. 
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One great mystery of the human experience is why our memories often act against our 
will – we remember events that are not particularly important to us, yet we forget the names and 
faces of new acquaintances that we try desperately to remember. Recent work has pinpointed a 
novel image attribute that can help explain what we ultimately remember – memorability, a 
predictive value of the likelihood of a novel event being eventually remembered or forgotten 
(Isola et al., 2011a). Despite our diverse unique experiences, we tend to remember the same 
scenes (Isola et al., 2011b), faces (Bainbridge et al., 2013; Bainbridge, 2016), and even 
visualizations (Borkin et al., 2013) as each other. A stimulus’s memorability plays a main role in 
influencing our future memories – intrinsic stimulus memorability makes up 50% of the variance 
in memory performance (with observer characteristics, environment features, noise, etc, making 
up the other 50%; Bainbridge et al., 2013). Image memorability shows stereotyped perception- 
and memory-based activity in the brain (Bainbridge et al., in press) and can also be predicted by 
convolutional neural networks (Khosla et al., 2015). Additionally, memorability cannot be fully 
explained by a wide range of face and scene attributes (Isola et al., 2011a; Bainbridge et al., 
2013), is surprisingly resilient to different time scales (Isola et al., 2013) contexts (Bylinskii et 
al., 2015), and transformations of the stimulus entity (Bainbridge, in 2016). With the 
combination of these results, memorability appears to be its own independent phenomenon and 
image attribute that can guide predictions of later memory. 
However, one alternative hypothesis is that these memorability effects are instead driven 
by attention. This could be in the form of bottom-up attention (also called exogenous attention) 
or also top-down attention (endogenous attention). Attention and memory are well-known to 
have a symbiotic relationship; with attention influencing what is encoded into memory, and 
previous experience also influencing what is attended to (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007). Certain 
types of stimuli are known to draw more attention than others (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; 
Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006; Cooper & Langton, 2006; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Trawalter 
et al., 2008), and stimuli that are attended to are more easily remembered (MacLeod, 1989; Chun 
& Turk-Browne, 2007). Memorability is similarly consistent across stimuli and predictive of 
later memory behavior. Thus perhaps memorability is synonymous with bottom-up attention 
orienting, or perhaps some of the robust effects of memorability can be largely explained by top-
down attentional effects. A final candidate explanation for memorability is priming, where 
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perhaps the non-attentive effects on memory from memorability could be instead explained by 
degree of priming caused by a stimulus. 
The current study explores the relationship between memorability and three attention-
related phenomena: bottom-up attention, top-down attention, and non-attentive priming. 
Experiments 1 and 2 find memorability does not influence bottom-up attention orienting in a 
spatial cueing task (Experiment 1) nor in a visual search task (Experiment 2). Experiments 3 and 
4 find memorability influences memory behavior separately from top-down attention effects 
such as cognitive control (Experiment 3) and deeper encoding (Experiment 4). Lastly, 
Experiment 5 finds that memorability also shows a separate effect from perceptual priming. 
Taken together, these results form powerful evidence that memorability is an isolated stimulus 
property that cannot be explained by bottom-up attention, top-down attention, or priming. 
 
Section 1: Memorability and Bottom-Up Attention 
 
Section Introduction 
Just in the same way emotional or threatening stimuli cause automatic bottom-up 
attentional orienting (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006; Cooper & 
Langton, 2006; Bar-Haim et al., 2007), it seems likely that highly memorable stimuli are 
memorable because they are attention-grabbing. Indeed, stimulus memorability has been found 
to be correlated with many of the same features that also cause bottom-up attentional orienting – 
emotion, threat, and contrasting colors and brightness (Isola et al., 2011; Bainbridge et al., 2013). 
Various works have also identified specific effects of distinctive stimuli on visual search tasks 
(Treisman & Gormican, 1988; Wolfe, 2001), and novel stimuli have been found to capture and 
bind attention in comparison to familiar stimuli (Horstmann & Herwig, 2015). While 
distinctiveness and novelty are not identical with memorability (Bainbridge et al., 2013), they are 
highly correlated. Together, it thus seems likely that memorability occurs because of visual 
features in that memorable stimulus that cause it to quickly and automatically capture attention. 
This hypothesis is tested with two paradigms often used in exogenous attentional 
experiments – spatial cueing and visual search. In the two following experiments, I find that 
while I am able to replicate the classical results of each task, memorability is found to have no 
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effect on bottom-up attention effects, providing evidence for memorability as an image property 
that does not necessarily capture bottom-up attention. 
 
Experiment 1: Memorability and Spatial Cueing 
Introduction 
One common exogenous attention paradigm that can be adapted for complex stimuli (i.e., 
photographs rather than shapes or colors) is the dot-probe paradigm, or spatial cueing task 
(Posner, 1980). Participants see two irrelevant visual cues on the left and right sides of a fixation 
cross, and then must categorize a target image that appears on either side. If one of the irrelevant 
cues captures attention, then participants will automatically orient and respond faster if the target 
also occurs on the same side (Posner, 1980). In the realm of faces, this paradigm has found 
attention orienting towards faces differing in emotion (Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006; 
Cooper & Langton, 2006), level of threat (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Bar-Haim et al., 2007), 
and race (Trawalter et al., 2008). This task is thus well-suited to examine whether memorable 
faces similarly cause automatic spatial cueing. If memorable images capture attention, then 
seeing a memorable face before a target should speed up the response to the target. 
Two spatial cueing experiments were conducted to examine the bottom-up attentional 
effects of memorability. The first experiment (Experiment 1-A) replicated previous spatial 
cueing work, using face images as cues, with half at a normal brightness level and the other half 
at a high brightness level (Johannes et al., 1995; Lupiáñez et al., 2004). The second experiment 
(Experiment 1-B) was a spatial cueing study using memorable and forgettable faces of equal 
brightness as the cues. While previous spatial cueing work was successfully replicated, 
memorability was not found to cause any spatial cueing effects. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Participants for the two experiments were recruited from online crowdsourcing platform 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). For this and all Experiments in the current study, data were 
collected following the standards of the MIT Institutional Review Board, and all participants 
provided consent for the study. There were 96 participants for Experiment 1-A and 98 
participants for Experiment 1-B. This large number of participants was recruited to ensure any 
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inability to detect an effect was not due to a small sample size, and unequal numbers of 
participants (for this Experiment and all following) were due to a small proportion of AMT 
workers accepting the experiment but quitting partway through (which is not uncommon in 
crowdsourced experiments: Eickhoff & de Vries, 2013). Two similar follow-up experiments 
were conducted with Experiment 1-B to confirm its effects, with 26 and 23 participants. All 
participants were compensated for their time. Only participants with over a 95% AMT approval 
rating and an IP address in the United States were recruited for the study, so that their exposure 
to different facial demographics would most closely match those of the stimulus set (designed to 
approximate the U.S. population). 
 
Stimuli 
Both experiments used the same base set of 80 face images, 40 determined to be highly 
memorable (top 25% of hit rate, HR; M=72.5%, SD=6.7%) and 40 determined to be highly 
forgettable (bottom 25% of HR; M=32.4%, SD=5.5%) in a previous large-scale online memory 
test (Bainbridge et al., 2013). The conditions were selected to have no difference in false alarm 
rate (FAR) and several low- and mid-level attributes (color, spatial frequency, emotion, 
attractiveness). Faces were also matched in memorable and forgettable pairs for gender, race, and 
age. All face images are 256 pixels in height and cropped with an oval to diminish background 
effects. For the brightened stimuli in Experiment 1-A, RGB values of the images were all 
uniformly increased by 140 points. 
 
Experimental Methods  
Both experiments were conducted with a spatial cueing paradigm designed based on 
previous spatial cueing work (See Fig. 1; Posner, 1980; MacLeod et al., 1986; Fox et al., 2008) 
implemented on online psychology experimental platform PsyToolkit (Stoet, 2010). 
A fixation cross was presented for 300ms, and then cue face images were presented 150 
pixels to the left and 150 pixels to the right of the fixation cross for 500ms. The face images 
disappeared and after a randomized delay ranging between 100ms and 500ms, two dots (the dot 
probe) were presented on one side of the fixation cross for up to 1500ms. The randomized delay 
was used so that participants had to remain attentive during the whole trial, and could not 
anticipate when the target would appear while ignoring the cues. Participants were asked to 
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respond as quickly and accurately as possible whether the dots were oriented horizontally or 
vertically, using a keyboard press that captured reaction time (RT). The position and orientation 
of the dot probe were randomly counterbalanced across trials. The face image cues had no 
relation to the dot probe. As soon as participants responded, the screen was cleared for 500ms 
and then continued onto the next trial. Participants were informed if their response was incorrect, 
and given their total correct at the end of the experiment. Each participant did 40 trials, of 
randomized order, and the experiment lasted approximately 3 minutes in total. 
For Experiment 1-A, each trial had a brightened (low-contrast) face and a normal 
brightness face image cue, with memorability controlled for between conditions. It is expected 
that normal brightness cue should capture attention and result in faster RTs. For Experiment 1-B, 
each trial had a forgettable face image cue and a memorable face image cue, matched for 
demographics and of equal brightness. If memorability captures attention in a similar bottom-up 
way, then dot probes matching the side of the memorable image should have faster RTs. 
Analyses only used RTs from trials where participants gave the correct response on the trial, 
however no statistical tests change in significance if incorrect trial RTs are also included. 
To ensure effects found from Experiment 1-B were not due to differences in trial timing, 
as there is debate in the literature in terms of the most effective spatial cueing task timing 
(Cooper & Langton, 2006), two almost identical follow-up studies to Experiment 1-B were also 
conducted. In the first version, the dot probe appeared immediately after the cues (as is more 
common in spatial cueing tasks: MacLeod et al., 1986), rather than after a jittered delay. In the 
second one, along with having no delay between cue and probe, the cues were also only 
displayed for 100ms (Cooper & Langton, 2006). 
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Results and Discussion 
For Experiment 1-A, reaction times for a target aligned with a visually salient cue 
(normal brightness, M = 603.17ms, SD = 152.34) were significantly lower than a target aligned 
with a less salient cue (very bright stimulus, M = 616.83, SD = 168.19), paired t-test: t(95) = 
2.24, p = 0.028. In contrast, no significant difference was found in Experiment 1-B for reaction 
times for targets aligned with memorable cues (M = 619.13ms, SD = 107.21) or forgettable cues 
(M = 624.62, SD = 115.09), t(97) = 1.03, p = 0.306. As a non-significant p-value does not 
indicate support for the null hypothesis, two-tailed Bayesian hypothesis testing was used to 
examine if these data support the null hypothesis (Gallistel, 2009; Jarosz & Wiley, 2014), where 
memorable cues and forgettable cues would indeed have no difference. This analysis uses 
Bayesian Factor analysis to determine the ratio of evidence (i.e., “odds”) in favor of one prior 
(the null distribution) versus an alternative prior (the largest plausible effect size; the effect size 
found in Experiment 1-A). The resulting odds (i.e., a Bayes factor, BF01) were 1.11:1 in favor of 
Irrelevant Cue
500 ms
500 ms
100 - 500 ms jitter
1500 ms max
MemorableForgettable
Respond with orientation (vertical)
Dot Probe Target
Fig. 1. The spatial cueing experimental paradigm for Experiment 1. Participants ignored cues (1-A: 
one that was very faded and one that was of normal brightness, or 1-B: one that was highly 
forgettable and one that was highly memorable) and responded with the orientation of a dot probe 
target. If their response time was influenced more by one type of cue over another, then 
memorability is likely to automatically capture attention. The face images used in this figure and 
all other figures in this paper are for illustrative purposes, and are within the public domain. 
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the null hypothesis, providing mild evidence that memorable and forgettable cues do not result in 
a different reaction time in a spatial cueing task.  
Different timings in Experiment 1-B did not cause an effect to appear; there was still no 
significant difference between memorable and forgettable image cue RTs when the random delay 
was removed (t(25) = 0.45, p = 0.660; BF01 = 1.08) or when the cue presentation time was 
changed to 100ms (t(22) = 0.67, p = 0.508; BF01 = 1.06).   
As expected, Experiment 1-A was able to successfully replicate previous effects found in 
spatial cueing paradigms based on a low-level visual feature (Johannes et al., 1995; Lupiáñez et 
al., 2004) that results in attentional capture. In contrast, Experiment 1-B did not find a link 
between memorability and attentional capture, even when using the same timings used by studies 
able to find attentional capture by emotional faces (Cooper & Langton, 2006). These results 
implicate memorability as a phenomenon separate from bottom-up attention; these highly 
memorable stimuli do not appear to contain low-level visual features that are automatically 
capturing attention. However, it is possible that another bottom-up attentional task may be better 
suited for uncovering attentional effects on memorability. 
 
Experiment 2: Memorability in Visual Search 
Introduction 
There has been debate as to whether spatial cueing attentional effects are robust and 
replicable (Staugaard, 2009), and its strongest effects with faces are often found in special 
populations (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Bar-Haim et al., 2007), or with strong threat-based 
biases (Trawalter et al., 2008). In contrast, a visual search paradigm may provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the interplay of memorability and attention, and lend evidence as to whether 
memorability is an attention-driven stimulus property. Do memorable targets quickly capture 
attention, and are thus easily identified? Do memorable distractors capture attention and make it 
harder to zero-in on a target? Previous work has found that it is easier to find a deviant amongst 
standard stimuli than vice versa (Treisman & Gormican, 1988; Wolfe, 2001). As memorable 
stimuli have been found to be generally distinctive (Bainbridge et al., 2013), it is possible that 
memorable stimuli may show the same pattern. 
In order to examine these questions, a face image visual search experiment was 
conducted online, with targets and distractors of varying memorabilities. If memorability 
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captures attention, we should anticipate that memorable targets will be very quick to be 
identified, but also that memorable distractors will detract attention from the visual search. 
However, if memorability does not capture attention, then we would not see a meaningful effect 
of target or distractor type. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited on AMT and compensated for their time. Ultimately 74 
Workers participated in the study. Only participants with over a 95% AMT approval rating and 
an IP address in the United States were recruited for the study. 
 
Stimuli 
The experiment used 180 highly memorable and 180 highly forgettable face images, from 
the set described in Experiment 1 Materials and Methods. 
 
Experimental Methods 
The experiment was coded and conducted using PsyToolkit (see Fig. 2). The stimuli were 
grouped into 32 conditions that varied along four factors: 1) whether the target was present or 
absent, 2) whether the target was memorable or forgettable, 3) whether the distractors were 
memorable or forgettable, 4) search set sizes of 4, 8, 12, or 16 stimuli. Participants were asked to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible whether a target was present or absent with a key 
press for both responses. 
For each trial, the target to search for was presented above the search display for 1500ms. 
Then, a search display as a 4 × 4 grid (similar to the visual search display of Golan et al., 2014) 
appeared below the target, separated by a horizontal line. The number of images in the grid was 
determined based on the set size of that trial (4, 8, 12, or 16), and were placed in randomized 
locations (with unused locations blank). On target present trials, the target was placed in a 
random location in the grid amongst distractors, while on target absent trials, only distractors 
were used. The target (if present) was either taken from the highly memorable or highly 
forgettable set, and the distractors were taken from either set, based on condition. The specific 
images used were selected randomly. 
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Participants were given 5000ms to make their response of target present or target absent 
and RT was measured. They were given feedback for 1000ms after every response. A noise 
mask was displayed for 200ms, and then there was a rest between trials for 2000ms. The target 
cue appeared before the search grid and remained on for the whole trial to diminish any memory-
related effects on performance. That is, even if a forgettable target may not cause lesser 
attentional capture compared to a memorable target, we could find a slower search response 
because participants are having a harder time remembering what the target looked like. With the 
target always available to the participant and with time before each trial to encode the target, 
ideally participants should be able to retain the target in memory for the duration of the trial. 
Participants completed 32 trials (one per condition), and the experiment took approximately 3 
minutes in total. Only trials where participants responded correctly on the task (target absent / 
present) were used in the analyses. Analyses were conducted using two methods: 1) looking at 
RT using repeated measures fixed effects linear mixed models (target presence, target 
memorability, and distractor memorability as categorical factors; set size as a continuous factor), 
and 2) looking at visual search slope (e.g., Wolfe, 1998; the slope of a regression line fit to each 
participants’ plots of set size by RT) in repeated-measures ANOVAs. 
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Results and Discussion 
Average RT based on target and distractor memorability can be seen in Fig. 3. As 
expected from other visual search studies (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), target absent trials took 
significantly longer to identify than target present trials (linear mixed model modeling main 
effects: F = 184.97, p = 2.40 × 10-40). Analyses were conducted separately for target present and 
target absent trials, as the interaction of memorability and attention could differ between these 
two different trial types (as there is no memorable or forgettable target in the target absent trials). 
For the target present trials, there was a significant main effect of set size (β = 61.55, SE 
= 8.88, F = 176.39, p = 5.70 × 10-37), with higher set sizes resulting in a longer RT, as expected. 
There was also a significant main effect of target memorability (linear mixed model: β = 326.19, 
SE = 137.22, F = 13.42, p = 2.63 × 10-4; main effect of target memorability in 2-way ANOVA on 
slope: F(1, 68) = 6.36, p = 0.014), with memorable targets generally identified faster than 
forgettable targets (the red solid lines in Fig. 3A). However, there was no significant main effect 
of distractor memorability (linear mixed model: β = -186.35, SE = 135.78, F = 2.61, p = 0.107; 
2-way ANOVA on slope: F(1, 68) = 0.920, p = 0.341; the red solid lines in Fig. 3B). A Bayesian 
1500 ms
5000 ms max
1000 ms
Memorable Target
Forgettable
Distractors
CORRECT
200 ms
Target Cue
Target Present Trial
Feedback
Mask
Fig. 2. The visual search experimental paradigm for Experiment 2. Participants searched for 
memorable or forgettable target face images amongst memorable or forgettable distractor images, 
with different search sizes. In half of the trials the target was present, while in the other half the 
target was absent. Participants made a response on every trial. 
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factor analysis also supports the null hypothesis, BF01 = 4.17, with an alternative prior derived 
from the RT difference between the target present and absent trials. In terms of statistical 
interactions, there was no significant statistical interaction of distractor type and target type 
(linear mixed model: β = 59.26, SE = 194.28, F = 0.09, p = 0.760; 2-way ANOVA on slope: F(1, 
68) = 0.522, p = 0.473), nor distractor type and set size (β = 23.66, SE = 12.76, F = 3.09, p = 
0.079). However, there was a significant statistical interaction of target memorability and set size 
(β = -18.01, SE = 12.84, F =  7.93, p = 0.005). There was no significant 3-way interaction of 
distractor type, target type, and set size (β = -13.33, SE = 18.23, F = 0.71, p = 0.400).  
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b) 
 
 
 
 
To understand the statistical interaction of target memorability and set size for the target 
present trials, paired t-tests of target memorability were conducted for each set size. Memorable 
targets only showed a RT advantage for the smaller set sizes of 4 (t(71) = 3.11, p = 0.003) and 8 
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Target Present
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Fig. 3. a) The mean reaction times of the conditions averaged by target memorability, at each 
search size. Dashed lines indicate target absent trials, while solid lines indicate target present trials. 
Red lines indicate memorable target trials, while blue lines indicate forgettable target trials. As 
expected, target absent trials take longer to identify than target present trials (i.e., dashed lines have 
longer RTs than solid lines). Larger set sizes also result in longer search times. However, there is 
no obvious effect of target memorability on search times; while target memorability shows an 
effect for some set sizes, these effects existed even when the target is absent from the search 
display. 
b) The mean reaction times of the conditions averaged by distractor memorability, at each search 
size. Dashed lines indicate target absent trials, while solid lines indicate target present trials. 
Red lines indicate memorable distractor trials, while blue lines indicate forgettable distractor trials. 
Again, target absent trials as well as larger search set sizes result in longer search times. However, 
there is no effect of distractor memorability on search times. 
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(t(71) = 2.61, p = 0.011), but there was no significant effect of target type for the larger set sizes 
of 12 (t(63) = 1.01, p = 0.316) or 16 (t(63) = -0.57, p = 0.569). (Note that the degrees of freedom 
differ due to 8 participants who did not successfully respond for any larger set size trials.) These 
results indicate that memorable targets have an effect on search times only at smaller set sizes. 
The target absent trials show a similar pattern (Fig. 3). Based on a three-way linear mixed 
model (target memorability × distractor memorability × set size) for target absent trials there is 
again, as expected, a significant main effect of set size (β = 78.73, SE = 8.24, F =  446.52, p = 
5.79 × 10-82), where it takes participants longer to confirm a target absent trial with more stimuli. 
There is no significant main effect of target memorability (linear mixed model: β = -143.52, SE = 
127.13, F = 0.21, p = 0.650; 2-way ANOVA on slope: F(1, 68) = 0.40, p = 0.530), and no 
significant main effect of distractor memorability (linear mixed model: β = -152.42, SE = 126.57, 
F = 0.13, p = 0.722, BF01 = 4.07; 2-way ANOVA on slope: F(1, 68) = 2.33, p = 0.131). There is 
no significant statistical interaction of target memorability and set size (β = 27.40, SE = 11.71, F 
= 3.27, p = 0.071) and no significant statistical interaction of distractor memorability and set size 
(β = 2.77, SE = 11.61, F = 1.35, p = 0.246). However, there is a trending significant statistical 
interaction of target memorability and distractor memorability (linear mixed model: β = 369.12, 
SE = 180.87, F = 4.17, p = 0.042; 2-way ANOVA on slope: F(1, 68) = 3.30, p = 0.074), where 
paired t-tests show that there is a significant target memorability effect when amongst 
memorable distractors (t(68) = 2.06, p = 0.043), but not when among forgettable distractors 
(t(69) = 0.96, p = 0.340). However, note that this means target memorability is modulating 
search times, where there is in fact no target present in the search display (i.e., on these target 
absent trials). There is no significant 3-way statistical interaction of target memorability, 
distractor memorability, and set size (β = -24.79, SE = 16.59, F = 2.23, p = 0.135). Looking at 
paired t-tests of target memorability at each set size, there is an effect of target memorability at 
the set sizes of 4 (t(67) = 2.91, p = 0.005), 8 (t(67) = 2.34, p = 0.022), 16 (t(68) = 4.35, p = 4.75 
× 10-5), but not at 12 (t(67) = 0.15, p = 0.881). 
While the target present and target absent trials appear to show the same patterns (e.g., 
target memorability effects at various set sizes, with no significant effect of distractor 
memorability), these results do not necessarily support a role of memorability in visual search. 
That is, there is an effect of target memorability (modulated by set size, and in the case of target 
absent trials, modulating distractor memorability effects), even when there is no target in the 
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search display. There is no purely bottom-up attentional explanation independent from memory 
that could explain how the memorability of a non-present stimulus would influence visual 
search. The memorability advantage to an absent target is likely instead related to the target 
search cue; perhaps a memorable cue is easier to hold in memory, so participants do not need to 
reference back to the cue as frequently during the search. This target memorability advantage is 
also unstable across set sizes, and may only work for smaller stimulus sets (i.e., where there are 
fewer images to hold in memory). 
Additionally, the lack of effect on search time from distractors of differing memorability 
provides compelling evidence against memorability being explained by attentional capture. If 
memorable images indeed capture attention, there should be some detrimental effect on reaction 
time of memorable distractors flooding the search display, however this is not found in the 
current study.  
 
Section Discussion 
Overall, Experiments 1 and 2 provide strong evidence using two very different paradigms 
to show that memorability is unlikely to be an image property that causes bottom-up attentional 
capture. Highly memorable stimuli do not cause automatic spatial cueing, nor do they 
meaningfully influence visual search times. Memorability as a property cannot be explained by 
exogenous attentional accounts, and images are not necessarily memorable because they are 
attention-grabbing.  
 
Section 2: Memorability and Top-Down Attention 
 
 Section Introduction 
While bottom-up attention is unable to explain memorability, memorability effects could 
instead occur due to intentional reallocation of attentional resources to stimuli that are later 
remembered. If memorability is determined by top-down attention, then can participants make 
themselves remember a forgettable image, or forget a memorable image? Does allocating more 
attentional resources to a stimulus cause one to remember it better? Previous work has found that 
cognitive control over memory as well as deeper encoding of certain stimuli over others may 
work through elaborately encoding distinctive features of a stimulus that one must remember 
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(Eysenck, 1979; Lockhart & Craik, 1990; Basden et al., 1993). Given that memorable images 
tend to be more distinctive (Bainbridge et al., 2013), perhaps cognitive control of attention 
results in more elaborate encoding, and thus a better memory for memorable images. 
Additionally, even if these effects do not fully encompass those of memorability, another 
important question is to what degree attention may mitigate the effects of stimulus memorability 
on later memory performance and vice versa. These questions were explored through two 
classical top-down attentional tasks – directed forgetting (Experiment 3) and a manipulation of 
encoding depth (Experiment 4) – which ultimately find that while directed forgetting and 
encoding depth still influence memory performance, memorability causes a stronger, separate 
effect on memory. 
 
Experiment 3: Memorability and Cognitive Control 
Introduction 
Previous work has found that participants are able to inhibit explicit memory of a 
stimulus when given a “directed forgetting” task, where participants are presented with an image 
or word and then immediately presented with instructions to either remember or forget that 
stimulus, but then later tested on their recognition memory of all presented images (MacLeod, 
1989). It is believed that the memory performance differences between images cued to be 
forgotten versus remembered is a greater degree of attention and more rehearsal of those cued to 
be remembered (MacLeod, 2012). Perhaps this greater rehearsal is the key to why some stimuli 
are consistently more memorable than others. 
To answer this question, a directed forgetting task was conducted with stimuli of 
differing memorability; participants were asked to remember or forget stimuli that were 
preselected to be of low, medium, or high memorability (unbeknownst to the participant), and 
then they were tested on their true memory. Depending on the interaction of cognitive control 
and memorability, there are two possible hypotheses we would expect. First, it is possible that 
memorability effects are largely explained by top-down cognitive control (i.e., a person decides a 
memorable image is interesting and decides to encode it). Similarly, it is possible that cognitive 
control would have a stronger influence on memory than memorability does, as cognitive control 
has a strong effect on explicit memory (MacLeod, 1989). If either of these are the case, then we 
should see that cognitive control is the main determinant of ultimate memory behavior, not the 
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memorability of the original image. An alternate hypothesis is that memorability is an intrinsic 
image property that is unaffected by cognitive control; while people will tend to forget images 
they try to forget and remember those they try to remember, memorability will have a stronger 
and separate effect on what they eventually remember and forget. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Seventy-two participants were recruited on AMT, and screened for having at least a 95% 
approval rating and an IP address within the United States. Participants were compensated for 
their time, and given an extra bonus for their performance on the memory test. 
 
Stimuli 
A set of highly controlled face stimuli of low (bottom 25%), medium (middle 25%), and 
high memorability (top 25%) were used as stimuli in this study (from the same stimulus set as 
Experiment 1 Materials and Methods). 
 
Experimental Methods 
The experiment followed the general methodology of other directed forgetting studies 
(MacLeod, 1989), and was coded using PsyToolkit. There were two phases to the experiment: a 
study phase and a test phase (see Fig. 4 for the experimental design). During the study phase, 
there were 20 stimuli each in a total of 6 conditions, varying along two factors: 1) memorability 
(low, medium, high), and 2) instructions to the participant (remember / forget), resulting in 120 
target stimuli total. For the test phase, there were an additional 120 faces of medium 
memorability to act as foil faces, with matched statistics with the target faces. Each participant 
only saw half of the targets and foils (60 images each) to reduce the length of the experiment, so 
each stimulus was seen by 36 participants. 
 In the study phase, participants were told that they were going to see a stream of face 
images, and after each image they would get a cue to either “remember” or “forget” the face. 
Note that it is important that the cue is after the presentation of the image, so that participants 
have the same degree of visual experience with each image (in the most extreme case, if the cue 
comes before the image, they could close their eyes for any image they are told not to encode 
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into memory). Participants were told they would be tested later on their memory and they would 
get bonus money based on their memory performance. These ambiguous instructions 
incentivized them to correctly follow the memory cues, as they were unaware that they would 
ultimately be tested on their recognition for all images. During the study phase, participants saw 
60 face images, each one presented for 1000ms, followed by a 2000ms remember or forget cue, 
and then a 500ms fixation cross. In total, the study phase took approximately 4 minutes. 
For the test phase, participants were then tested for their memory. They were told to try 
and recall everything that they saw (counter to their original expectations), and respond based on 
whether they had seen the image before or not, regardless of whether they were originally asked 
to remember or forget it. They were given up to 1500ms to respond to each face which was then 
followed by a 500ms fixation cross, and they were rewarded with bonus money based on correct 
responses. 
 
 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
A summary of the main results can be seen in Fig. 5. A 2-way repeated measures 
ANOVA on participant memory performance during the test phase for the different conditions 
found a significant main effect emerged of memorability level, F(2 , 426) = 33.93, p = 9.02 × 10-
Forget
Study Phase Test Phase
1000 ms
2000 ms
500 ms
Target stimulus 
of known 
memorability
Memory cue
Target
(Correct 
response: YES)
Foil 
(Correct 
response: NO)
<1500 ms
500 ms
Fig. 4. The experimental methods of the study and test phases of the directed forgetting paradigm 
used in Experiment 3. In the study phase, participants saw a stream of face images (of low, 
medium, or high memorability) and for each one, were directed to either remember or forget that 
image, with the incentive of a monetary bonus. In the test phase, participants were told to instead 
try and remember all of the images they saw in the study phase, regardless of memory cue. 
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13, with an effect size of ηp2 = 0.32. There was also a significant effect of the memory cue, with a 
lower HR for images participants were told to forget than those they were told to remember (F(1, 
426) = 5.76, p = 0.019), although a smaller effect size of ηp2 = 0.08. However, there was no 
significant statistical interaction between the two factors (F(2, 426) = 0.26, p = 0.775, BF01 = 
7.19), indicating that directed forgetting does not appear to influence memorability effects. 
Looking at specific effects within memorability using paired t-tests, highly memorable 
images were remembered significantly more than moderately memorable (t(71) = 4.26, p = 6.13 
× 10-5), and moderately memorable images were remembered significantly more than low 
memorable ones (t(71) = 4.59, p = 1.88 × 10-5). 
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Fig. 5. The hit rates of the different conditions, varying along memorability level (low, medium, or 
high) and memory cue (forget or remember). The false alarm rate for the foil images (all of 
medium memorability) is also presented as a point of comparison. Error bars indicate standard 
error of the mean. While there was an effect of the memory cue (people better remembered images 
they were told to remember than those they were told to forget), image memorability had a 
significant effect on subsequent memory of larger effect size, with no statistical interaction with 
directed forgetting. 
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In sum, these results indicate that people still significantly remembered memorable 
images over forgettable images, regardless of the memory cue they were presented with at the 
study phase. At the same time, participants were still correctly performing the task, and the study 
was able to replicate directed forgetting effects, though with a weaker effect than the effect of 
memorability. This provides strong evidence that memorability is a relatively immutable 
property of an image or entity, and that memorability effects cannot be explained by a cognitive 
control account. Interestingly, just as directed forgetting does not affect implicit memory 
measures like priming (Vuilleumier et al., 2005), directed forgetting does not alter the influence 
of memorability on memory performance, providing evidence that memorability could fall along 
the border of implicit and explicit memory (see Section 3). Essentially, no matter how hard one 
tries, you cannot make yourself remember a forgettable image, or make yourself forget a 
memorable image. 
 
Experiment 4: Memorability and Depth of Encoding 
Introduction 
Another top-down attentional phenomenon that could interact with memorability is depth 
of encoding, or different levels of processing (Lockhart & Craik, 1990). When stimuli are 
processed in terms of their semantics or meaning (i.e., deep encoding), they tend to be 
remembered better than when they are processed in terms of their perceptual features (i.e., 
shallow encoding) (Bower & Karlin, 1974; Sporer, 1991; Innocenti et al., 2010). This is thought 
to be due to the greater amount of attentional load and effort required to do deeper processes 
(Lockhart & Craik, 1990). Memorability effects could thus occur due to deeper encoding or more 
attentional resources put into remembering memorable images. Perhaps people perform more 
semantic processing with memorable images (e.g., perhaps they are more interesting or have 
more semantic content), and thus encode the images deeper. 
This question was addressed using an encoding depth task (Bower & Karlin, 1974), 
where participants categorized sets of memorable and forgettable face stimuli using tasks of 
three different encoding depths – identifying the color of a fixation cross (shallowest task), the 
gender of a face (shallow task), or judging the honesty of the face (deep task). Participants were 
then given an unexpected memory test. If memorability effects occur due to deeper encoding, 
then controlling for depth of encoding should eliminate a difference between memorable and 
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forgettable images. Alternately, if memorability is intrinsic to images and distinct from encoding 
depth, we expect to find separate effects of stimulus memorability and task encoding depth on 
subsequent memory. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Seventy-two participants were recruited on AMT, and screened for having at least a 95% 
approval rating and an IP address within the United States, to reduce the likelihood of 
demographics-based biases like the other-race effect (Chiroro & Valentine, 1995). Participants 
were compensated for their time. 
 
Stimuli 
A set of highly controlled face stimuli of low and high memorability were used as stimuli 
in this study (see Experiment 1 Materials and Methods). Faces were used as several encoding 
depth studies have established paradigms using faces (Bower & Karlin, 1974; Sporer, 1991). 
 
Experimental Methods 
The experiment followed the general methodology of other depth of encoding 
experiments (Bower & Karlin, 1974; see Fig. 6). The experiment had four parts, and participants 
did not know of the different parts beyond the fact that they were related to faces. The first three 
parts comprised the study phase, using tasks of three different encoding depths where 
participants had to make different binary decisions on the face images, and the fourth part was an 
unexpected test phase. For the shallowest processing task, participants were asked to identify the 
color (black or white) of a fixation cross that appeared on the face image (the “fixation task”). 
For a deeper task, participants were asked to identify the gender (male or female) of a face image 
(the “gender task”). This task is often used as the shallow processing task in depth of encoding 
experiments (Bower & Karlin, 1974), however as gender determination requires holistic face 
processing, it is likely that it is “deeper” than the fixation cross task. Lastly, for the deepest task, 
participants were asked to judge how honest (honest or dishonest) they thought a face was (the 
“honesty task”), as used in other work (Bower & Karlin, 1974). All tasks had a black or white 
fixation cross on each face (with color distributed evenly over memorable and forgettable 
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images), so stimuli were visually identical and differed only in task and randomized image set. 
Forty target face stimuli were used in each task, with half being highly memorable images and 
the other half highly forgettable, resulting in 120 target stimuli total. However, each participant 
only saw half of the stimuli (60 images) to reduce the length of the experiment, so each stimulus 
was seen by 36 participants. Each image was displayed for 1000ms and was separated by a 
500ms fixation cross, for a total time of 30s per part. The order of these three tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants, images were randomly sorted into each task, and 
participants were asked to focus only on the task at hand and not think about the other tasks they 
had completed. 
The fourth part for all participants consisted of an unexpected memory test phase. 
Participants saw a stream of images and were told to identify which they had seen earlier in the 
experiment. Sixty of the images were targets, while 60 were foils, and they were presented in a 
randomized order. Participants were given up to 1500ms to respond to each face which was then 
followed by a 500ms fixation cross. Both reaction time and performance were recorded. The 
experiment took approximately 5 minutes in total. 
 
 
 
 
 
Study Phases: Fixation / Gender / Honesty Task Unexpected Memory Test Phase
1000 ms
500 ms
Fixation task: Black
Gender task: Male
Honesty task: Honest
Target
(Correct 
response: YES)
Foil 
(Correct 
response: NO)
<1500 ms
500 ms
+
+
Fixation task: White
Gender task: Female
Honesty task: Honest
Fig. 6. The depth of encoding experimental design of Experiment 4. The experiment consisted of 
four parts. The first three were identical in paradigm, but had three different tasks, counterbalanced 
in order across participants: 1) the fixation task, 2) the gender task, and 3) the honesty task. 
Displayed are example responses that would be indicated based on the task. After the three study 
parts, participants then completed an unexpected memory test on all the stimuli that were presented 
in the three previous parts. 
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Results and Discussion 
A graphical summary of the results can be seen in Fig. 7. Based on a 2-way within-
subjects repeated-measures ANOVA (memorability × encoding depth) on RTs, participants 
responded significantly faster to memorable images in the memory test than to forgettable 
images (F(1, 426) = 10.87, p = 0.002), with an effect size of ηp2 = 0.13. There is also a 
marginally significant main effect of the encoding task on RT (F(2, 426) = 2.98, p = 0.054, ηp2 = 
0.04), with faster reaction times for images that were studied with deeper encoding. However, 
there is no significant statistical interaction between memorability and encoding depth with RT 
(F(2, 426) = 0.94, p = 0.395, BF01 = 5.30). 
Based on a paired t-test, RTs during the memory test to memorable images were 
significantly different from those to foil images (t(71) = 3.30, p = 0.002), however forgettable 
image RTs were not different from those of foils (t(71) = 0.27, p = 0.790, BF01 = 1.09). When 
looked at by task using paired t-tests, RTs in the memory test were not significantly different 
between memorable and forgettable images for the fixation task (t(71) = 1.02, p = 0.313), 
however they were for the gender task (t(71) = 2.06, p = 0.043) and the honesty task (t(71) = 
3.24, p = 002). 
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Participant performance in the memory test mirror these RT results. In a 2-way repeated 
measures ANOVA of memorability and encoding depth, there is a significant main effect of 
memorability on HR (F(1, 426) = 70.73, p = 2.91 × 10-12, ηp2 = 0.50). There is also a significant 
main effect of task encoding depth on HR (F(2, 426) = 36.32, p = 1.83 × 10-13, η2 = 0.34), with 
smaller effect size, where images that were encoded with a deeper task show a higher HR. There 
was also a significant statistical interaction between memorability and encoding depth (F(2,426) 
= 4.77, p = 0.01). 
Paired t-tests were used to investigate specific differences between the conditions and this 
interaction effect. Memorable images were remembered significantly more often than forgettable 
images on all of the tasks (paired t-tests; fixation task: t(71) = 6.37, p = 1.61 × 10-8; gender task: 
t(71) = 8.12, p = 1.02 × 10-11; honesty task: t(71) = 5.23, p = 1.61 × 10-6). Looking at paired t-
tests based on the encoding task, for forgettable images, performance was significantly higher for 
the gender task than the fixation task (t(71) = 3.98, p = 1.62 × 10-4), and higher for the honesty 
task than the gender task (t(71) = 3.84, p = 2.67 × 10-4). For memorable images, performance 
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Fig. 7. (Left) Reaction time on the unexpected recognition memory test based on the different 
conditions. Memorable images had significantly faster reaction times than forgettable images. 
There is also a significant effect of task encoding depth, with deeper tasks causing faster 
recognition, however there is no statistical interaction between memorability and encoding depth. 
The reaction time to respond to foil images is comparable to that of forgettable images. (Right) Hit 
rate on the unexpected recognition memory test based on the different conditions. Memorable 
images had significantly higher hit rates than forgettable images. Similarly, greater encoding depth 
also resulted in higher hit rates, however there was no statistical interaction between memorability 
and encoding depth. The bar for the foil images here reflects false alarm rate, for a point of 
comparison. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
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was significantly higher for the gender task than the fixation task (t(71) = 5.63, p = 3.33 × 10-7), 
but there was no difference for the honesty task compared to the gender task (t(71) = 0.10, p = 
0.923).  This is likely due to the fact that performance for these two tasks for memorable images 
is essentially at ceiling; when told to explicitly remember these images (see Experiment 3; these 
are the same image sets), participants have about the same performance (gender task M = 0.76, 
honesty task M = 0.76, explicit memory M = 0.73). This ceiling effect also likely explains the 
statistical interaction between memorability and encoding depth. 
These results show strong effects of both memorability and encoding depth on 
subsequent memory. In fact, performance was significantly better for memorable than forgettable 
images on all tasks, and memorability effects had higher effect sizes than encoding depth effects. 
This indicates that controlling for encoding depth does not equalize memorability; even if you 
are encoding a set of images deeply and semantically, you will still remember memorable images 
more than forgettable images. Or, similarly, even when focusing on an irrelevant perceptual item 
(i.e., fixation crosses overlaid on the images), you will still remember memorable images more 
than forgettable images. These results imply that effort, distribution of attentional resources, or 
elaboration of encoding are unlikely to explain the phenomena we find with memorability. 
 
Section Discussion 
Overall, Experiments 3 and 4 show that while intentional memory encoding and deeper 
processing do indeed boost memory performance, these boosts are separate from and often 
weaker than the impact of the intrinsic memorability of the stimulus to be remembered. 
Memorability is thus neither equivalent to bottom-up attention, nor top-down attention. As it 
seems that memorability is not an attention-based phenomenon, these results also provide 
evidence that memorability may not be an explicit memory phenomenon, as cognitive control is 
known to be able to influence explicit memory, but not implicit memory (MacLeod, 1989; 
Vuilleumier et al., 2005). One final important question, then, is how memorability might relate to 
an implicit memory process in the absence of attention. 
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Section 3: Memorability and Priming 
 
Introduction 
As memorability appears to be a nonconscious, implicit, automatic form of memory that 
is independent of attentional effects, how is it linked to perceptual priming, a similarly automatic 
and nonconscious form of memory? Like memorability, perceptual priming has been shown to 
be unaffected by changes in low-level visual features (Fiser & Biederman, 2001) and top-down 
attention (Vulleumier et al., 2005). Since memorability seems to happen at the timing of 
perception but does not capture bottom-up attention, memorability might thus reflect the 
“primability” of a stimulus – to what degree behavioral and neural responses are affected by 
increasing repetitions of an initially novel stimulus. Memorable images might be those that cause 
greater priming effects, while forgettable images show less priming. 
To test the link between memorability and “primability”, a perceptual priming 
experiment was conducted, where participants had to rapidly categorize scene images for indoor 
/ outdoor (Experiment 5-A) or natural / manmade (Experiment 5-B). Images were repeated four 
times each, but with the repetitions spread across the stimulus presentation stream in a 
randomized order. Due to perceptual priming, with increasing repetitions a stimulus will become 
easier (and faster) to categorize. If memorability and primability are linked, then memorable 
images should show a more pronounced drop in reaction time with each repetition, in 
comparison to forgettable images. However, if memorability and primability are separate 
phenomena, then the memorability of the stimulus should not affect priming effects. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Forty-nine participants recruited from AMT participated in Experiment 5-A, and a 
separate set of 48 participants participated in Experiment 5-B. They were selected for having at 
least a 95% approval rating, and were compensated for their time. 
 
Stimuli 
Scene images from a highly controlled stimulus set for both low-level visual features 
(e.g., color, spatial frequency) and higher-level attributes (e.g., number of objects, average object 
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size) were used in the two experiments (Xiao et al., 2010; Isola et al., 2013). Scene images were 
used here as they can be easily and quickly categorized for multiple category dichotomies (e.g., 
indoor / outdoor, natural / manmade), yet do not have the potential demographic-based 
categorization biases that could occur with faces, such as the other-race effect (Chiroro & 
Valentine, 1995) or other-age effect (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005). All images were color and 256 
pixels × 256 pixels.  
 
 
 
 
 
For Experiment 5-A, the scene images varied along two factors with 4 conditions total, 
with 12 stimuli each, or 48 stimuli total: 1) memorable or forgettable, and 2) indoor or outdoor. 
Experiment 5-B had the same stimulus condition distributions, except its second factor was 
natural or manmade, and all images were outdoor scenes. The images for the two stimulus sets 
were selected from the same larger scene stimulus set. 
 
 
300 ms
<2000 ms
Indoor / outdoor 
Response
Indoor / outdoor 
Response
Indoor / outdoor 
Response
Primed Trial
Fig. 8. The perceptual priming experimental paradigm for Experiment 5. Half of the images were 
highly forgettable, while the other half were highly memorable. Participants responded as quickly 
as possible to a perceptual categorization task (indoor / outdoor for Experiment 5-A, natural / 
manmade for Experiment 5-B) for a stream of images, where sometimes an image would repeat. 
On these repetition trials, we can observe the effects of perceptual priming (reaction time 
decreasing on repeated stimuli), and if this differs between memorable and forgettable stimuli. 
28 
 
Experimental Methods 
Both experiments were programmed and conducted using PsyToolkit and followed the 
same experimental paradigm (Fig. 8). For each trial, a fixation cross was displayed for 300ms. A 
scene image was then presented at central fixation, and participants were given 2000ms to 
classify the image as indoor or outdoor in Experiment 5-A or natural or manmade in Experiment 
5-B with a key press, with reaction time recorded. Each image was repeated four times over the 
course of the experiment in a randomized order, although participants were not told in advance 
that they would see image repetitions. Participants were informed if they responded incorrectly, 
or took too long (over 2000ms) to respond, to encourage quick and accurate responses. For both 
experiments, participants completed 192 randomized order trials, which took approximately 3 
minutes in total. Only trials with the correct task responses were used in the analyses. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Experiment 5-A: Indoor / Outdoor Task 
A graphical summary of the results can be seen in Fig. 9. A 2-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA (memorability × repetition number) was conducted on the reaction times. As expected 
based on previous perceptual priming work (Wiggs & Martin, 1998; Turk-Browne et al., 2006), 
with increasing repetitions of an image, participants were able to more quickly identify it as 
indoor / outdoor (F(3, 184) = 29.23, p = 2.60 × 10-12). However, memorable and forgettable 
images had no significant difference in how long it took to classify them as indoor / outdoor 
(F(1, 184) = 0.002, p = 0.968, BF01 = 4.89). There was also no significant statistical interaction 
between the two factors for RT (F(3, 184) = 1.54, p = 0.213, BF01 = 2.26), indicating that 
forgettable and memorable images did not appear to experience different degrees of priming. A 
linear mixed model modeling memorability as a categorical factor and repetition number as a 
continuous factor shows the same patterns; RT speeds up with more repetitions (β = -19.88, SE = 
3.09, F = 104.65, p = 2.13 × 10-19), but memorability shows no effect (β = 12.20, SE = 11.96, F = 
1.04, p = 0.309), nor is there a statistical interaction between memorability and repetition number 
(β = -4.93, SE = 4.37, F = 1.27, p = 0.261). Based on paired t-tests, forgettable images and 
memorable images showed no significant RT differences at any repetition number (all p > 0.05). 
Thus, while scene images do show perceptual priming, there appears to be no differences 
between memorable and forgettable images. 
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Experiment 5-B: Natural / Manmade Task 
To fully ensure there is no interaction of memorability and primability, the study was 
replicated using a different categorization task (natural / manmade), see Fig. 9. Again, as 
expected, there was a significant effect of image repetition on classification speed (F(3, 184)  = 
13.39, p = 5.55 × 10-7). However, there was again no significant effect of memorability (F(1, 
184) = 4.14, p = 0.054), although in the Bayesian Factor analysis, there was more evidence for 
the alternate hypothesis than the null hypothesis: BF01 = 0.67, indicating unclear evidence for 
whether memorability has an effect on natural / manmade responses. However, importantly there 
was no statistical interaction between image repetition and memorability (F(3, 184) = 1.27, p = 
0.293, BF01 = 2.58), indicating that the effect of memorability does not change with priming. A 
linear mixed model modeling memorability as a categorical factor and repetition as a continuous 
factor finds a significant effect of repetition (β = -11.46, SE = 3.89, F = 30.56, p = 1.22 × 10-7), 
but no effect of memorability (β = 9.87, SE = 15.08, F = 0.43, p = 0.514) nor a statistical 
interaction of memorability and repetition (β = -7.53, SE = 5.51, F = 1.87, p = 0.174). Looking at 
the difference between memorable and forgettable images at each repetition using paired t-tests, 
memorable images were significantly faster to classify than forgettable images at the forth 
repetition (t(47) = 3.31, p = 0.002), however there were no significant differences at the first, 
second, or third presentations of the image (all p > 0.4). Again, this study shows no strong 
evidence for a differential priming effect between forgettable and memorable images.  
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Both Experiments 5-A and 5-B replicate the finding that while people become faster at 
categorizing scenes (for either indoor / outdoor or natural / manmade) with increasing repetitions 
of an image, this speed increase (or “primability” of the stimulus) does not appear to be related to 
memorability. If this were the case, then one would expect to see a significant statistical 
interaction between repetition time and image memorability. This being said, memorable images 
were classified significantly faster in the fourth presentation in the natural / manmade 
categorization task. Because this effect did not exist across the two tasks, it is unlikely that it is 
due to differential perceptual priming and memorability. Ultimately, both Experiments 
demonstrate that memorability is its own automatic, intrinsic image property, separate from 
perceptual priming effects. 
These results bring up an interesting question of whether memorability can be considered 
an implicit or explicit memory phenomenon. These current results show evidence that 
memorability does not resemble other common implicit memory phenomena, such as priming, 
despite being a similarly automatic, unconscious marker of memory. However, memorability is 
also different from explicit memory phenomena, like found in individual explicit recall, because 
it is unaffected by bottom-up and top-down attention (Vuilleumier et al., 2005). Previous work 
has found a neural dissociation between implicit memory (i.e., perceptual priming) and explicit 
memory (i.e., subsequent memory), where implicit memory shows repetition suppression and 
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Fig. 9. (Left) The mean reaction time for forgettable versus memorable scenes in Experiment 5-A 
(indoor / outdoor), by repetition number. Perceptual priming occurred equally for forgettable and 
memorable images. (Right) The mean reaction time for forgettable versus memorable scenes in 
Experiment 5-B (natural / manmade), by repetition number. Again, there was no significant effect 
of memorability, nor an interaction of perceptual priming effect and memorability, showing that 
memorability is unlikely to be equivalent to “primability”. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
mean. 
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explicit memory shows pattern similarity (Ward et al., 2013). Neural signatures of memorability 
have been identified in many memory-related regions, such as the medial temporal lobe 
(Bainbridge et al., 2017), and future work will need to investigate whether memorability 
somehow bridges this dissociation of implicit and explicit memory, or could serve as an 
interesting test case of how we define these two phenomena. 
 
General Discussion 
 
This set of five experiments shows strong evidence that memorability effects cannot be 
explained away by attention-related phenomena known to usually interact with memory. 
Namely, we find that: 
 
Memorability does not cause bottom-up attentional capture, as memorable images do not 
produce biases in a spatial cueing task (Experiment 1), nor in a visual search task (Experiment 
2). 
Memorability is not affected by top-down attention, as you cannot make yourself forget a 
memorable image, or remember a forgettable image (Experiment 3), and memorability effects 
exist independent of how deeply stimuli are encoded (Experiment 4). 
Memorability is not the same as priming – although these are both automatic, 
unconscious forms of memory independent from attention, these are two separate memory 
phenomena (Experiment 5). 
 
These results provide further evidence that memorability is an intrinsic, isolated property 
to an image or an entity (Isola et al., 2011a; Bainbridge et al., 2013), that goes beyond low-level 
visual features that automatically capture attention. The perceptual features that cause images to 
be memorable are likely much more subtle and later in the visual processing hierarchy, as 
evidenced by deep-learning models of memorability (Khosla et al., 2015), and will need further 
investigation (though with some preliminary findings in Isola et al., 2011b; Bainbridge et al., 
2013). Additionally, memorability may be pinpointing a novel subprocess of memory, as it is 
resilient to attentional effects, unlike explicit memory encoding, which is often considered 
intertwined with attention (Mulligan, 1998; Kim, 2011). In fact, even explicitly attempting to not 
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encode a memory still results in memorability effects on later retrieval. Perhaps the only way to 
escape the strong effects of memorability may be through direct manipulation of the image, to 
diminish the features that make it memorable (Khosla et al., 2013). At the same time, these 
results also show that memorability may not be a purely implicit memory phenomenon, as it is 
independent from priming effects. The question of memorability as either an implicit or explicit 
memory phenomenon is an extremely interesting one that may challenge notions of the two types 
of memory being completely dissociable (Ward et al., 2013). As shown by these five 
Experiments, memorability is extremely easy to adapt to classical behavioral and neuroscientific 
paradigms, as it is only a matter of measuring and selecting stimuli, and several memory studies 
could be reanalyzed with a focus on stimulus memorability. Thus, there is a large range of 
possibilities for further investigations on the role of memorability in terms of implicit versus 
explicit memory, bottom-up versus top-down processing, and perception versus memory.  
Overall, attention is not a determinant of memorability. While attention-grabbing stimuli 
may tend to be more memorable, these are two isolable phenomena; images do not need to be 
attention-grabbing or cause implicit priming to ultimately be more memorable. Memorability is 
also unwavering, regardless of the effort or depth with which you process images. In whole, 
memorability has shown itself to be an independent, intrinsic property to images serving as a 
strong determinant of what we will ultimately remember. 
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